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Abstract: A number of mathematical modelling techniques exist which are used to measure the performance of a given system, by
assessing each individual component within the system. This can be used to determine the failure frequency or probability of failure
of the system. Software is available to undertake the task of analysing these mathematical models after an individual or group of
individuals manually create the models. The process of generating these models is time consuming and reduces the impact of the
model on the system design. One way to improve this would be to automatically generate the model. In this work the procedure to
automatically construct a model, based on Petri nets, for systems undergoing a phased-mission is applied to a pressure tank system,
undertaking a four phase mission.
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1 Introduction
The design stage of any new system is a critical time to
ensure that the system meets all required standards, par-
ticularly those where failures could result in fatalities. By
modelling the reliability of the system, alternative design
solutions could be investigated and the direction of the de-
sign could be influenced in order to meet these regulatory
requirements. A number of mathematical modelling tech-
niques exist to determine the reliability of a system, such as
fault trees, event trees and Markov analysis. These models
cannot usually be created by a member of the design team
as they do not have the necessary expertise to carry out
the process. Therefore a specialist group or team is often
brought in to model the reliability of system designs. The
process of creating these models is lengthy and can limit
their usefulness, as during this time the design progresses.
This causes a lag between the reliability predictions of the
design and its development, which reduces the influence of
reliability predictions.
The analysis of the models, once constructed, has been
the main focus over the years and can now be completed
effectively and efficiently. However, the construction of the
models still requires significant time and effort, and a par-
ticular skill set. One way to improve this is to construct
the models automatically. Doing this would enable the de-
sign teams to carry out the reliability assessment without
acquiring expertise in reliability methods. Automation of
the reliability models also reduces the time spent on the
model construction and removes human construction er-
rors. The automatic construction of Fault trees has received
the most attention, using a variety of methods. The most
commonly used approaches to generate Fault Trees include
diagraphs[1], decision tables[2], transition tables[3] and mini
fault trees[4]. All these approaches have some form of re-
striction on their application and so no one method can be
applied to all systems. Apart from Fault Tree Analysis,
automation processes for other modelling techniques have
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received little attention. The aim of the work presented
here is to outline an approach to automate the generation
of a reliability model for a system undertaking a phased
mission. In order to describe the process an example of a
pressure tank system has been described in detail. Phased
missions are a collection of consecutive time periods, or
phases, where a system must meet different requirements
in order to complete the phase successfully. For the mis-
sion to be a success each phase within the mission must
be successful, therefore any failures within any phase will
result in mission failure. Techniques currently used to as-
sess phased-missions include Fault Tree Analysis, Markov
Analysis and simulation. Fault Tree Analysis and Markov
Analysis both suffer from increasingly large models as the
system grows and/or the number of phases within a mis-
sion increases. Simulation techniques suit such situations
better due to their computational nature allowing for com-
plex systems and scenarios to be considered. A simulation
technique which is designed for ease of representation, with
significant modelling power is the Petri net (PN). Hence in
this paper the automatic generation of a PN model for a
system undertaking a phased mission is described. Initially
a brief description is given of PNs in section 2, then the gen-
eral automated process is outlined in section 3. The process
applied to an example is described in detail in section 4 and
validated for a single mission in section 5. Results for multi-
ple missions for the example are given in section 6 and then
some general conclusions are drawn in the final section.
2 Petri nets
A Petri net is a bipartite directed graph with two types
of nodes; places and transitions. Places are represented by
circles and transitions are represented by either hollow or
solid bars. A solid bar is an immediate transition, i.e. the
time to transition is zero. A hollow bar represents a time to
transition which is greater than zero. Directed arcs create
links between the places and the transitions; but places can
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only link to transitions and vice versa. Multiple links can
occur between places and transitions. This can be shown by
a dash on the arc with a number placed next to it to show
the multiplicity. If there is no dash then the multiplicity of
the arc is one. Another element of a Petri net is tokens, or
marks, which reside within the places. These are passed be-
tween different places by the switching of transitions. The
dynamic behaviour of the Petri net model is represented by
this switching of the transitions. At any given time, the
distribution of tokens, or net marking, within the Petri net
represents a different system state. This is of great interest
to the analyst. An example of transition switching is given
in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 Example Petri net of a transition enabling and firing
Fig. 1 shows a transition with two input places; the first
linked to the transition with an arc of weight 5 and another
linked to the transition with a single arc of weight 1. When
all the input places contain at least the weight number of to-
kens, or marks, the transition becomes enabled. Therefore
for the transition to be enabled the first place must contain
at least 5 tokens and the second must contain at least 1.
This transition has a delay of time, t, associated with it.
The switching of the transition cannot occur until this de-
lay of t has lapsed whilst the transition is enabled. Should
this delay be zero, then a solid bar would be present, to rep-
resent an immediate transition. Once the delay has passed
whilst the transition has remained enabled, the switching
can occur. The switching process removes 5 tokens from
the top place and 1 token from the bottom place, and a
single token is placed in the output place connected to the
transition.
3 Model Generation
3.1 Description requirements
Before a reliability model can be created, details of the
system and the mission are necessary. These details fall
into the following categories;
• Component description in the form of component
models including the component failure modes.
• System structure in the form of a system topology
diagram.
• Mission Description in the form of phase models
and, initial and starting conditions.
• System failure conditions
• Failure and repair data
To model the components two tables are used; decision
tables and operational mode tables. Decision tables de-
scribe how the component reacts to inputs from other com-
ponents in the system, depending on the current state of
the component. Operational mode tables, similar to state
transition tables[5], are only used for components that have
more than one mode of operation. These tables describe
how the mode of operation can be changed, when a com-
mand to the component is introduced. For example, if a
switch, which is currently open is commanded by an opera-
tor to close, as long as the switch is in a working condition,
the switch would change mode from open to closed. The
system topology diagram describes how the components are
linked together. The phase models describe the different
phases the mission can enter with the condition of the sys-
tem needed to transition from one phase to another. The
initial conditions are the conditions the components must
satisfy in order for the mission to commence. The system
failure conditions are the system failure modes. The failure
and repair (if applicable) data is necessary for each compo-
nent in the system to determine a reliability estimate.
3.2 Model Construction
The model is comprised of four distinctive Petri nets;
component nets (CPN), system nets (SPN), phase nets
(PPN) and circuit nets (CiPN). Each is necessary to model
a different aspect of either the system or the mission. This
approach of using distinctive PNs can be seen in the work
of [6] and [7]. In this work the CPNs model the components
failure and repair. Any circuits identified in the system are
represented by the CiPNs. These are used to identify at any
given time whether there is current (C) or no current (NC)
present in the circuit. Circuits are identified by the soft-
ware created, by locating all components identified as able
to pass current, and which exist within a loop. This pro-
cess uses the component descriptions in conjunction with
the system topology to obtain the list of circuits present.
These are only necessary for systems that contain electrical
circuits. The SPN is the collection of all CPN instances and
the connections, or links, between them in the system. The
SPN is generated using the information stored in the topol-
ogy diagram. The PPN describes the mission the system
is undertaking. This is created from the phase transition
table; each row of the table represents a transition within
the PPN.
3.3 Software Structure
To demonstrate the overall structure of the software Fig.
2 shows how the information described in the previous sec-
tion about the system, including the components and the
mission, are used to create the different Petri net types dis-
cussed above.
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Fig. 2 Software structure diagram
4 Pressure tank system
To demonstrate the construction procedure created, a
pressure tank system has been used as a case study. The
pressure tank system used here is undertaking a four phase
mission.
4.1 System description
The aim of the system shown in Fig. 3 is to control the
filling and emptying of the tank (T). The initial state of
the system is that it is dormant and therefore de-energised.
The push-switch (S1), the timer contact (TC) and the relay
contact (RC) are open. The toggle switch (S2) and valve
(V) are closed. The tank is empty. All components are
working at the start of each mission.
The system is initially started by the operator depressing
switch S1, momentarily applying power to the timer relay
(TIM), whose contacts close and start the timer. Switch
S1 contacts open. Power is applied to relay (R) whose con-
tacts close and start the pump motor. The tank starts to
fill. After a time t1 the timer relay contacts open, relay R
de-energies and its contacts open thus removing power from
the pump motor. When T is de-energised the timer clock
resets. The operator will notice the tank pressure by the
pressure gauge and will open the valve to empty the tank.
After a time t2 the tank will have emptied sufficiently for
filling to start again by the operator pressing switch S1 and
closing the valve. Switch S2 is a safety mechanism built
into the system so that in the event that a failure occurs
and the tank overfills the operator, who will be alerted by
the pressure gauge, can stop the pump by opening that
switch, hence denying power to R.
Switch S1
Valve
Pump
Fuse
M
R
Pressure 
Gauge
Tank
TIM
Operator
Switch S2
Fig. 3 Schematic of pressure tank system
4.2 Mission Description
The mission is described in the phase transition table
seen in Table 1. The four main phases of the mission are
detailed below:
• Phase 1: System start-up, discrete phase at t = 0.
• Phase 2: Filling of the tank, duration t1.
• Phase 3: Opening the valve on the tank, discrete phase
at t = t1.
• Phase 4: Emptying the tank, duration t2.
The four main phases represent the system in a fully
working condition; therefore other phases are required to
signify when the system enters a failure phase, these are
listed as follows:
• Phase 5: System failure due to overfill
• Phase 6: System overfill with system shutdown
• Phase 7: System overfill without system shutdown
• Phase 8: System failure not due to overfill
• Phase 9: Mission success
Table 1 Phase transition table for four phase mission
Time From Phase To Phase Condition
1 0 1 2 TC mode=closed
2 Delta 1 8 TC mode=open
3 t1 2 3 T out1=CONST
4 - 2 8 T out1=CONST
5 - 3 4 V mode=open
6 Delta 3 5 V mode=closed
7 t1 + t2 4 9 T out1=DEC
8 - 4 8 T out1=CONST
9 Delta 5 6 RC mode=open
10 Delta 5 7 RC mode=closed
The condition to enter each of these phases is seen under
the heading of condition in the phase transition table. The
transitions between phases are all based on the condition of
a component within the system. For example, the transition
between phase 1 and 2 can only occur if the condition that
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component TC is in the mode closed at time t = 0. When
time is designated as Delta, this refers to a small amount
of time and is used in situations when a single components
output or mode of operation could change the system state.
In this example t1 = 1hr and t2 = 2hrs.
4.3 Software inputs
The failure modes of each component type are listed in
Table 2. The failure data of each component is required
to create the delayed transition within the component PNs.
Each component is considered separately and this informa-
tion is entered by the system designers through a text file
that specifies the identifier of the component with either
the distribution type, or types, that the component fails
by or a definitive value. A definitive value can be used to
test how the system would react to a specific component
failure at a given time. Using the distribution type and a
random number generator a time to failure is generated for
each component instance. For this system all components
are assumed to fail by the exponential distribution. The
failure rate of each component failure mode is listed in Ta-
ble 2. The system topology diagram of the pressure tank
system is shown in Fig. 4. The decision and operational
mode tables for the components within the system can be
found from Table 3-16. These are generated from compo-
nent information and the topology diagram. In the tables
FL and NFL denote flow and no flow, EN and DE denote
energised and de-energised, CL, OP and NA denote close,
open and no action and LPR, HPR and VHPR denote low
pressure, high pressure and very high pressure, respectively.
Decision tables are time dependent when a time, t, column
is included, which dictates when that transition can occur.
Table 2 Component failure mode descriptions and failure data
Failure Mode Failure Rate Description
S1 FCL 0.1 Switch failed closed
S1 FOP 0.1 Switch failed open
S2 FCL 0.001 Switch failed closed
S2 FOP 0.8698 Switch failed open
PS1 F 0.001 No power
PS2 F 0.001 No power
RC FCL 0.00023 Contacts failed closed
RC FOP 0.00023 Contacts failed open
TC FCL 0.1 Contacts failed closed
TC FOP 0.1 Contacts failed open
TIM F 0.001 Relay failed de-energised
R F 0.1 Relay failed de-energised
FS F 0.01 Fuse broken
M F 0.001 Motor broken
P F 0.1 Pump broken
V FCL 0.03 Valve failed closed
V FOP 0.03 Valve failed open
OP F 0.1 Operator fails to take action
T F 0.0001 Tank leaks significantly
PG FLOW 0.01 Gauge stuck at low pressure
PG FHIGH 0.01 Gauge stuck at high pressure
PG FVHIGH 0.01 Gauge stuck at very high pressure
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Fig. 4 System topology diagram for the pressure tank system
Table 3 Operational mode table for push switch, S1
Mode 1 Command (In1) State Mode 2
1 Closed – FCL Closed
2 Closed CL – Closed
3 Closed NA W Open
4 Open – FOP Open
5 Open NA – Open
6 Open CL W Closed
Table 4 Operational mode table for toggle switch, S2 and
Valve, V
Mode 1 Command (In1) State Mode 2
1 Closed – FCL Closed
2 Closed CL – Closed
3 Closed OP W Open
4 Closed NA – Closed
5 Open – FOP Open
6 Open OP – Open
7 Open CL W Closed
8 Open NA – Open
Table 5 Operational mode table for contacts, RC and TC
Mode 1 Command (In1) State Mode 2
1 Closed – FCL Closed
2 Closed EN – Closed
3 Closed DE W Open
4 Open – FOP Open
5 Open DE – Open
6 Open EN W Closed
Table 6 Decision table for switches, S1 and S2, and contacts,
RC and TC
In 2 Mode Out
1 – Open NC
2 NC – NC
3 C Closed C
Table 7 Decision table for power supplies, PS1 and PS2, and
fuse, FS
In State Out
1 C W C
2 – F NC
3 NC – NC
K.Stockwell et al. / Preparation of Papers for International Journal of Automation and Computing 5
Table 8 Decision table for timer relay, TIM
t In State Out 1 Out 2
1 t < t1 C W EN C
2 t ≥ t1 C W DE NC
3 – – F DE NC
4 – NC – DE NC
Table 9 Decision table for relay, R
In State Out 1 Out 2
1 C W EN C
2 – F DE NC
3 NC – DE NC
Table 10 Decision table for junctions, J1, J2, J3 and J4
In 1 In 2 Out 1 Out 2
1 C – C
2 – C C
3 NC NC NC
4 C C C
5 NC NC NC
Table 11 Decision table for motor, M
In State Out 1 Out 2
1 C W C ON
2 – F NC OFF
3 NC – NC OFF
Table 12 Decision table for pump, P
In State Out
1 ON W FL
2 – F NFL
3 OFF – NFL
Table 13 Decision table for pressure gauge, PG
t In State Out 1
1 t < t1 CONST W LPR
2 t < t1 INC W LPR
3 t1 CONST W LPR
4 t1 INC W HPR
5 – DEC W LPR
6 t1 < t ≤ t1 + t2 CONST W HPR
7 t1 < t ≤ t1 + t2 INC W VHPR
8 – – FLOW LPR
9 – – FHIGH HPR
10 – – FVHIGH VHPR
Table 14 Decision table for valve, V
In 2 Mode Out
1 – Closed NFL
2 NFL – NFL
3 FL Open FL
Table 15 Decision table for tank, T
t In 1 In 2 State Out 1 Out 2
1 – FL Open W CONST FL
2 – FL Closed W INC NFL
3 – NFL Closed W CONST NFL
4 t ≤ t1 NFL Open W CONST NFL
5 t1 < t ≤ t1 + t2 NFL Open W DEC FL
6 t ≤ t1 – – F CONST NFL
7 t1 < t ≤ t1 + t2 – – F DEC NFL
Table 16 Decision table for operator, OP
t In 1 State Out 1 Out 2 Out 3
1 0 LPR W CL CL CL
2 0 < t < t1 + t2 LPR W NA NA NA
3 – HPR W OP NA NA
4 – VHPR W NA OP NA
5 – – F NA NA NA
4.4 Petri net models
4.4.1 Component and system Petri nets
The CPNs are constructed directly from the decision and
operational mode tables, where each row of the tables is
treated as a separate transition. For decision tables, the
conditions under the headings: In i, State, and Mode are
used as input places to the transitions, and the conditions
under the heading Out i are treated as the output places.
Within the operational mode tables the headings Mode 1,
In i and State are treated as the input places of the tran-
sition and the conditions under the heading Mode 2 are
treated as the output place of the transition. An example
of the push switch, S1, CPN using both Table 3 and Table
6 can be seen in Fig. 5. The working to failed state PN for
each component is created separately from the table using
the failure data. The state that the component is in then
feeds into the CPN, as shown for S1 by the dotted arrows
in Fig. 5. If the component only has one failure mode then
a single transition will exist between the working and failed
state places. If however the component has multiple failure
modes and the distributions by which they fail are different,
then a delayed transition will exist for each failure mode.
If all failure modes fail by the same distribution then a sin-
gle delayed transition is required between the working and
a designated failed state. From the failed state the failure
mode it has entered will be determined by which mode the
component currently resides within. During the construc-
tion process of the CPNs, a time to failure for each com-
ponent is generated using the information given in Table
2. Each of these values follow an exponential distribution
shown in (1).
Q(t) = 1− e−λt (1)
Where Q(t) is the unreliability at time t and λ is the
failure rate.
To obtain the time to failure (1) is rearranged for t.
Components with other distributions, namely normal and
weibull distribution are also accepted by the software. The
time to failures are generated from these distributions in
similar ways. The SPN is generated by merging the output
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place of one component to the input place of the connected
component, until all components are connected together.
An example of this connection can be seen in Fig. 6. This
is completed using the information in the topology diagram.
Fig. 5 Component Petri net of S1
Fig. 6 Example section of the system Petri net of S1 and J1
connected
4.4.2 Circuit Petri nets
The CiPNs are automatically generated using the list of
circuits identified. The circuits identified within this system
are as follows:
• C1 ={PS1, S2, J2, TIM, J3, J4, TC, J1, PS1}
• C2={ PS1, S2, J2, TIM, J3, J4, S1, J1, PS1}
• C3={PS1, S2, J2, R, J3, J4, TC, J1, PS1}
• C4={ PS1, S2, J2, R, J3, J4, S1, J1, PS1}
• C5={PS2, F, RC, M, PS2}
An example of a constructed CiPN can be seen in Fig.
7 for the circuit list C3. The CiPNs connect to the SPN
through a component within the circuit list. The CiPN
acts as a way of initiating the flow of tokens within the
SPN, showing either the flow or no flow of current in the
circuits of the system. One half of the CiPN describes the
condition for current within a circuit; all components must
either be in a working condition, or completing the circuit
through the mode of the component. Using the example of
the CiPN in Fig. 7, for current to flow within the circuit,
the components PS1 and R must be in a working state, and
S2 and TC must be in an operational mode of closed, to
create a complete circuit connection. The second half of
the CiPN describes the condition(s) required for no current
within the circuit. In the example, PS1 or R could be in a
failed state, or S2 or TC could be in an operational mode
of open. One of these conditions would cause a state of no
current flowing within that circuit.
Fig. 7 Circuit Petri net for circuit list C3
4.4.3 Phase Petri nets
This phase transition table, Table 1, shows all the con-
nections between the different phases the system can en-
ter. The software generated automatically detects the main
phases of operation from the table, and identifies them as
such. The software also identifies the duration of each main
phase. All other phases are then created. A transition is
created for each row of the table and the switching condi-
tions are based on the information given. The PPN controls
all time aspects found within the phase transition table and
component decision tables. An example of a section of the
PPN can be seen in Fig. 8. The numbers on the figure show
the connection to other parts of the PN model.

Fig. 8 Section of the phase Petri net showing the transition
between phases
K.Stockwell et al. / Preparation of Papers for International Journal of Automation and Computing 7
5 Validation
5.1 Phase fault trees
To validate the model a single four phase mission has
been considered. The phase fault trees, as defined in [8],
were used. Each of the four phases of the mission can be
seen from Fig. 9-12. In the phase fault trees the subscript
numbers identify which of the phases the component can
fail in, to contribute to the failure of the current phase. It
should be noted that this generally only affects components
with multiple modes of operation, as the time in which the
component fails, dictates the mode in which the component
fails within. The phase unreliability was calculated using
the minimal cut set upper bound approximation, seen in
(2).
Q(t) = 1−
N∏
i=1
(1− P (Ci)) (2)
Where, P (Ci) is the probability of cut set i occurring
and N is the total number of cut sets.
Applying (2) to each of the phase fault trees in Fig. 9-12,
the equations obtained can be seen in (3), (5), (7) and (9),
respectively.
Q(Phase1) = 1− (1− P (S1OP1)(1− P (PS11))
(1− P (TCOP1))(1− P (TIM1)) (3)
A common term within the phase 2 unreliability equation
is seen in (4).
X = S1OP1.PS11.TCOP1.T IM1 (4)
Q(Phase2) = 1− (1− P (X.R12))(1− P (X.RCOP1))
(1− P (X.M12))(1− P (X.FS12))(1− P (X.PS212))
(1− P (X.T12))(1− P (S1OP1.PS11.TCOP1.T IM2))
(1− P (X.P12))(1− P (S1OP1.TCOP1.T IM1.PS12)) (5)
A common term within the phase 3 unreliability equation
is seen in (6).
Y = S1OP1.PS112.TCOP1.T IM12.R12.M12.FS12.P12.
T12.RCOP1.PS212 (6)
Q(Phase3) = 1− (1− P (Y.VCL13)(1− P (Y.OP13))
(1− P (Y.PGL13)) (7)
A common term within the phase 4 unreliability equation
is seen in (8).
Z = S1OP1.PS112.TCOP1.T IM12.R12.M12.FS12.P12.
T12.RCOP1.PS212.VCL13.OP13.PGL13 (8)
Q(Phase4) = 1− (1− P (Z.RCCL12)(1− P (Z.S1CL1))
(1− P (Z.TCCL12)) (9)
The analytical values calculated from (3), (5), (7) and
(9) can be seen in the first row of Table 17.
OP1 1
OP11
Fig. 9 Phase 1 fault tree
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Fig. 12 Phase 4 fault tree
Table 17 Comparison of analytical and simulated data
Phase Number 1 2 3 4 Mission
Analytical 0 0.1927 0.1061 0.0670 0.3658
Simulation 0 0.1990 0.1080 0.0645 0.3715
Difference (%) 0 3.25 1.80 3.74 1.56
5.2 Convergence study
A convergence study on the simulation model was carried
out for each phase of the mission and the overall mission
unreliability. The first phase, a discrete phase, was com-
pleted successfully each time, i.e. no failures occurred in
this phase. The second, third and fourth phase all start
to converge within ± 5% of the values given in the second
row of Table 17 at approximately 2100 simulations. Phases
2, 3 and 4 can be seen in Fig. 13-15, respectively. The
overall mission unreliability is constant within ±5% from
1250 simulations. The convergence can be seen in Fig. 16.
From this it can be seen that there is great potential in the
method used to generate the reliability models.
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Fig. 13 Comparison of phase 2 unreliability over the 10,000
simulations and the analytical unreliability
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Fig. 14 Comparison of phase 3 unreliability over the 10,000
simulations and the analytical unreliability
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Fig. 15 Comparison of phase 4 unreliability over the 10,000
simulations and the analytical unreliability
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Fig. 16 Comparison of mission unreliability over the 10,000
simulations and the analytical unreliability
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6 Analysis of multiple missions
The previous section studied the results for a single mis-
sion undertaken by the pressure tank system. The calcula-
tion of a single mission for this example can be carried out
using the fault tree method by individuals with the correct
skill set, but can take a considerable time to complete. To
calculate the reliability of a system that will undertake a
mission numerous times is more complex. The software has
been designed to show how the system will behave over mul-
tiple missions. It is assumed that the system is continuously
carrying out the mission; it is never shutdown in-between
missions. For this study the failure data in Table 2 was
divided by 103 to represent components designed to last
for multiple missions. For non-repairable systems, the re-
liability of a system is the same as the availability of the
system over a given time. In the previous study for a single
mission it was seen that all phase calculations converged
within the given tolerance of the analytical value at ap-
proximately 2100 simulations. Therefore, 2500 simulations
was used for the study of multiple missions. The simula-
tions carried out 5000 consecutive missions. The individual
phases of the mission can be found in Fig. 17. Fig. 17
shows that the system is more likely to fail within the first
two phases of the mission, rather than the latter phases.
Fig. 18 shows the mission unavailability of the system over
the 5000 consecutive missions. As expected the data showed
that as the number of missions demanded on the system in-
creased, the likelihood that the system could carry out the
required number of missions decreased. At approximately
3000 consecutive missions, the likelihood that the system
would complete this number of missions was close to zero.
Fig. 18, showing the mission unavailability, follows that of
an exponential distribution, which would be expected of a
non-repairable system.
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Fig. 17 Individual phase unavailability over 5000 missions
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Fig. 18 Missions unavailability over 5000 missions
7 Conclusion
In this paper a procedure for automatically generating a
reliability model based on Petri nets and simulation, from
a description of a system and its operation has been de-
scribed. The procedure has been demonstrated by applying
it to a simple non-repairable example. The work presented
here demonstrated that the model generation process was
successful in generating the phase failure probabilities for
this system considered within a given tolerance of ±5%.
The software developed can also be used to determine the
availability of a non-repairable system over a given number
of missions. For the non-repairable example considered it
was seen that the unavailability in this case, as expected
followed an exponential distribution.
The procedure is currently been applied to a more com-
plex repairable system in order to validate its general use.
Also to improve this method of automation a technique tak-
ing the system description in the form of a CAD (Computer
Aided Design) diagram or a Piping and Instrumentation
Diagram (P&ID) to generate the component tables is cur-
rently being investigated.
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